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The aim of this paper is to develop a dynamic model of migrations, in which migration is 
driven by size asymmetries between countries and by the relative preferences of consumers 
between private consumption and consumption of public goods. The dynamic tra jectories 
heavily  depend  on  the  degree  of  attractiveness  for  public  goods  We  show  that  monotone 
migrations require suﬃciently strong preferences for public goods, and can only be sustained 
from the small to the large countries. We identify the threshold value of the public goods’ 
intensity of preferences guaranteeing the survival of the small country. For weaker preference 
intensities, oscillating migrations may arise, but they ﬁnally converge to situation where both 
countries are of equal size. 
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This paper is based on the following simple intuition. The provision of most
public goods is nanced through public spending. Public spending is based
on the product of taxes. When a country has many citizens, the basis for tax
collection is wider than when the country has only a few ones. Thus larger
countries are able to provide a larger amount of public goods than the small
ones and, as far as individuals are attracted by public goods' abundance,
they should be more satised when living in large than in small countries1.
Accordingly, if the cost of moving is not too large, one should expect a
populations' drain from small countries to the big ones through migration.
This explanation is however a little simplistic, and forgets a crucial el-
ement. When more and more people leave the small country to enjoy the
larger amount of public good provided in the big one, it cuts down progres-
sively the amount of labour force available in the small country, with the
likely eect of increasing the local wage rate. Now, while becoming higher
and higher in the small country, the wages can at some point make the lat-
ter more attractive, compared with the attractiveness of the big country,
resulting from its higher amount of public good ! In turn, this increase
in attractiveness of the small country may well constitute soon a stronger
countervailing force than the original attractiveness of the large country, and
lead accordingly to a reversal in the direction of migration!
In order to disentangle the precise eects of these forces on the pattern
of migrations, it is useful to embed the problem into a simple general equi-
librium model for studying rigorously the dynamics of migrations entailed
by these forces. We propose hereafter such a framework, which develops
along the following lines. We suppose that there are two countries, home
and foreign, of unequal size in terms of the number of their citizens. Hetero-
geneity among the citizens in each country is introduced by assuming that
they incur varying (subjective) costs when moving abroad. In each country,
a private composite commodity is produced by a prot-maximising rm via
a decreasing returns technology, using labour as sole intput. Individuals are
each endowed with a single unit of homogeneous labour supplied inelasti-
cally on the local labour market. The local wage rate is determined by the
equality of demand and labour supply. Individuals are utility maximizers.
1 Alesina et al. (2005, page 1503) notice for example that , \...safety is a public
good that increases with country size". Moreover Ram (2008) has recently challenged the
nding of Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) that there is a negative covariation of country size
with the share of public consumption in GDP. The author even nds a signicant positive
covariation between government size and country size.
1In each country, the government levies an income tax which serves to -
nance the provision of the public good produced under a constant returns
technology, and available for consumption to all residents in the country.
The net income is then spent by residents as a private consumption. The
resulting individual utility thus depends, when staying at home, on the local
wage and tax rates. When the home citizen decides to emigrate, it depends
now on the foreign wage and tax rates, but the cost of migrating has now
to be deducted from the utility. Accordingly, the only decision to be taken
by an individual is whether she/he prefers to stay in her/his home country
to enjoy private consumption and the amount of local public good, or to go
abroad and enjoy there private consumption and foreign public good, but
then paying the cost incurred for moving abroad. The only decision to be
taken by each government is the national tax rate, which automatically de-
termines the amount of the public good via the state budget constraint. In
order to focus on labour mobility we assume that rms are (internationally)
immobile and that entry costs for new rms are prohibitively high.
After solving this static model, we turn to its dynamics. The above
equilibrium analysis, which is essentially static, spontaneously invites to
a dynamic extension: migration observed at equilibrium in period 0 as a
consequence of the initial populations' shares now generates renewed initial
populations' sizes in period 1: More generally, the migration observed at
equilibrium in period t as a consequence of the initial populations' shares
existing in the period now creates renewed initial populations'sizes for period
t+1:Accordingly, a sequence of successive competitive equilibria is naturally
generated as a consequence of the equilibrium migration arising in each
period, which constitutes the initial conditions of the equilibrium for the
next one.
The question to be answered is to clarify the trajectories of these dy-
namics. In particular, we want to know whether the forces described above
drive inexorably the small country to become smaller and smaller due to
migrations to the larger one, even with the risk of its disappearance, or
whether some oscillating behavior should be observed in the direction of
migration. Clearly, due to the preferences of individuals which ultimately
drive the dynamics of the model, the answer to this question should depend
on the relative intensity of individual preferences for the private versus pub-
lic good. The attractiveness of the larger country is tantamount larger, the
larger the intensity of preferences for the public good, compared with the
intensity of preferences for private spending. Our main result consists rst
in nding a sucient condition, bearing on the intensity of preferences for
the public good, for obtaining a monotone convergence of migrations from
2the smaller to the larger country. We also show that this condition is neces-
sary for obtaining monotone convergence: monotone convergence can never
arise from the larger to the smaller country. Of course, when the intensity
of public good's preferences is very strong, one can imagine that this could
even endanger the very survival of the small country. Thus, we also identify
the upperlimit on the intensity of public good's preferences which guaran-
tees the survival of the small country in the long run. On the contrary, when
the intensity of preferences for the public good decreases below a threshold
value, we show that two issues are possible. Either, migration takes place
only during a single period, and then stops for ever. Or, when the prefer-
ences for the public good are really weak, migration's dynamics oscillate
from period to period but, nally, populations' sizes tend to become equal
in the two countries.
There is a signicant literature pointing to the fact that small states
suer from their smallness (for a brief survey, see Easterly and Kray, 2000)).
In this context it is often argued that small countries face high per capita
costs for providing public goods because large indivisibilities are the rule in
the provision of these goods. In this paper we focus on another limitation
which results from the standard theory of local public goods and concerns the
attractiveness of public goods supplied by small jurisdictions in the context
of migration. In the vein of Tiebout (1956), jurisdictions are assumed to
provide local public goods so that everyone living in the same community
consumes the whole quantity of this good. The production of the local good
being nanced by a local tax levied on the residents of the jurisdiction,
it follows that the volume (intensity or quality) of public goods rises with
the size of the local tax base. Accordingly, when people are allowed to
choose the jurisdiction where to move, small sized jurisdictions tend to be
disadvantaged with respect to the larger ones.
Our paper is also related to the political economics approach to the
migration problem which studies, in the tradition of Tiebout, how people
migrate on the basis of public good preferences. Factor mobility is not only
motivated by dierences in income but also by the provision of public goods.
In our model size asymmetry between countries is crucial in causing migra-
tion. The dynamics of the model then show that migration also explains how
this asymmetry may evolve. Accordingly, the size of the involved countries
are shown to be determined endogenously. In this respect, our approach
may also be related to Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Alesina, Spolaore
and Wacziarg (2005), who are concerned with the endogenous determination
of country size.
Our contribution also highlights the fact that some size asymmetries be-
3tween countries cannot remain sustainable in the long term. Indeed, labor
mobility and migration may exacerbate size asymmetry between countries
to such an extent that the very survival of the small country could be threat-
ened in the long run. In this context, the model is related to the literature
concerned with geographic agglomeration (for an interesting survey, see Ot-
taviano, and Thisse, 2004). On the contrary, our paper also shows that
countries' asymmetries are wiped out when preferences for the public good
are weak.
2 The model
We consider two countries, home (h) and foreign (f); the population types
in h (resp. f) is represented by the [0;1]-interval, with density h in country
h (resp. f in country f), h + f = 1. Each individual in each country
is endowed with one unit of homogenous labour. Wages are denoted by wh
and wf; respectively: An individual of type x;x 2 [0;1]; either decides to
work in his/her own country, say country i, or he/she migrates to the foreign
one, j;j 6= i;(j;i = h;f): In the rst case, his/her utility is given by




uj(x) = wj(1   tj) + 2
p
jwjtj   x
when migrating, with ti denoting the tax rate in country i;i = h;f; and
x the disutility of emigrating for an individual of type x. Accordingly,
heterogeneity among types in each country is generated by the disutility of
emigrating, and types are ranked in the [0;1]-interval by order of increasing
disutility incurred from emigrating. As for the term 2
p
iwiti; it measures
the utility of the public good made available in country i thanks to the tax
proceeds iwiti; with  denoting the intensity of preferences for the public
good. For simplicity, we set in the following: f = 0 and h = 1 0, with
0 and 1   0 measuring respectively the foreign and the domestic country
initial populations' densities. Populations' densities at some date t will be
denoted accordingly by t and 1   t:
The production function F(L) of the representative rm in each country
is identical and given by




with L denoting labour used in the production process.
43 The competitive equilibrium at time t = 0:
Assume that individuals in both countries supply inelastically the unit of
labour they are initially endowed with. Aggregate labour supply in country i
is then equal to the population's density in this country, namely Lh = 1 0
and Lf = 0 in country h and f; respectively. From prot maximisation,
the demand function for labour obtains from the condition that the wage
rate is equal to its marginal product, namely
wi = F0(Li) = 1   Li:
Accordingly, equilibrium wage rates are given by
wh = 0 and wf = 1   0.
For simplicity, we assume that the resulting prots of the rm are invested
outside the area in which we are interested in2. The government in each
country is assumed to select a tax rate ti,i = h;f, (and an ensuing amount of
public good) in order to maximize the utility of the representative resident3.
This assumption leads to the government's payo function
Rh(th;tf) = (1   th) + 2
p
th(1   ) (1)
in the home country with population's density 1   , and to the payo
Rf(th;tf) = (1   tf)(1   ) + 2
q
tf(1   ) (2)
in the foreign one with population's density . From the rst order condi-
tions, we easily get the optimal taxes t
h and t










for the initial populations' densities 0 and 1   0:
Let us now state three simple properties observed at the competitive
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The net wage wi = wi(1   ti),i = h;f, at the competitive
equilibrium is the highest in the smallest country.
2Think of tax heavens, like the Channel Islands or Cayman Islands... Our capitalists
can be viewed as the absentee landlords in Hansen A. and Kessler (2001).
3Notice that this policy does not take into account the fact that it can induce some
home residents to leave the country for abroad or, conversely, to attract some foreign
residents at home. Accordingly, the government's behavior is assumed to be myopic.
5Proof. From wh = 0 and wf = 1 0:we have that wf  wh = (1   20).
It follows that wf > wh i 0  0 < 1
2 (f is the small country) and wh > wf
i 1 > 0 > 1
2(h is the small country).
Similarly, we have that
Proposition 2 The smallest country charges the smallest tax rate at the
competitive equilibrium and provides the smallest amount of public good.
Proof. The rst part of the proposition follows from a direct comparison
of the optimal taxes (see (3)). Now, given the optimal taxes obtained in
(3), the state budget is equal to
(1 0)2
0 at home and to
2
0
1 0 in the foreign
country. Accordingly, the state budget at home is the largest i either
0  0 < 1
2 (f is the small country), or 1 > 0 > 1
2(h is the small country).
Since the amount of public good is equal to the amount of the state budget,
the second part of the proposition follows.
Denote by  the dierence Rh(th;tf)   Rf(th;tf) with Rh and Rf as
given by (1) and (2). When this dierence is positive, country h is more
attractive than country f; and the most mobile citizens in country f are
willing to migrate to country h: The reverse holds when the dierence 
is negative, entailing a migration from h to f. Assume, without loss of
generality, that 0 > 1   0:Then, using the equilibrium values th and tf
given by (3), we get
 = Rh(th;tf)   Rf(th;tf) = (1   )(20   1) < 0
when  > 1;so that migration takes place from home to foreign, and
 = Rh(th;tf)   Rf(th;tf) = (1   )(20   1) > 0
when  < 1; in which case migration takes place from foreign to home.
Without loss of generality, assume that  > 1 so that migration takes place
from home to foreign.The type x in the home country who is indierent
between migrating or staying at home must satisfy  = x < 0. Substituting
in the dierence Rh(th;tf) Rf(th;tf); with Rh and Rf as given by (1) and
(2), for the equilibrium values th and tf given by (3), we obtain
j(0)j = x0 = (1   )(1   20); (4)
given the initial sizes of the populations 0 and 1   0: Consequently, all
individuals in the home country belonging to the types in the interval [0;x0]
migrate to the foreign country, as a consequence of the equilibrium taxes
6and the resulting public goods' dierential between the two countries. Ac-
cordingly, equation (4) reveals that the migration pattern at equilibrium
crucially depends on the parameters  and 0; i.e., the intensity of prefer-
ences for the public good and the initial sizes of the countries: The following
proposition describes unambiguously the migration pattern at equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Migration takes place at the competitive equilibrium from
the home country to the foreign one ()  > 1 and 0 > 1
2; or  < 1 and
0 < 1
2: In the rst alternative, the home country is the small country while
the reverse holds in the second.
4 The dynamics of migration
The above equilibrium analysis, which is essentially static, spontaneously
invites to a dynamic extension: the migration observed at equilibrium in
period 0 as a consequence of the initial populations' shares 0 and 1   0
now creates renewed initial conditions in period 1, say 1 and 1   1: More
generally, the migration observed at equilibrium in period t as a consequence
of the initial populations' shares t and 1   t now creates renewed initial
conditions for period t + 1, say t+1 and 1   t+1: Accordingly, a sequence
of successive competitive equilibria is naturally generated as a consequence
of the equilibrium migration arising in each period, which constitutes the
initial conditions of the equilibrium for the next one.
4.1 Migration dynamics when  > 1
In order to study the dynamics of these successive competitive equilibria,
we consider rst the case when  > 1: As we show later, this condition
guarantees that these dynamics are monotone through time. Then, assuming
that x0 = (1 )(1   20) > 0; equation (4) can be written more generally
as
xt = (1   )(1   2t) > 0; (6)
where t refers to any time period: Under the monotonicity assumption, the
variable xt is positive because we have assumed x0 > 0:The population's
density in country f at time t + 1 writes as
t+1 = 0 + (1   0)xt: (7)
7Combining the two above equations gives the rst order dierence equation
xt+1 = f (xt) =  2(1   )(1   0)xt + x0 (8)
which describes the trajectory of migrations corresponding to the successive
competitive equilibria in the sequence. Whenever it exists, the xed point
of this trajectory is given by the solution x to the equation  2(1   )(1  
0)x + x0 = x; namely,
x =
(   1)(20   1)
2(   1)(0   1) + 1
:
:
In order to identify under which condition the above dynamics are indeed
monotone, we analyse equilibrium migrations as a function of the preference
intensity for the public good, :
Proposition 4 Migrations are monotone if, and only if, 1 <  < 3 0
2 20:
Furthermore, they can only take place from the small to the large country.
Proof. First remember that the steady state share of migrants (in total
initial population of the foreign country) is equal to x =
( 1)(20 1)
2( 1)(0 1)+1.The
condition for having monotone convergence to x(migration from f to h with







xt=x < 1. According to equation (8),
we get  2(1   )(1   0) < 1 () 1 <  < 3 0
2 20. The second part of the
proposition follows directly from the fact that convergence implies that the
preference parameter  has to be larger than 1 and, since x0 > 0, it follows
that 0 has to exceed 1
2.
The case considered in the above proposition is depicted in gure 1 in
the appendix.
We have assumed above that migration takes place from the home to the
foreign country. According to the above proposition, we conclude that this
can happen under monotone dynamics only when the home country is the
small one. The above proposition implies that the small country becomes
smaller and smaller through time. This raises the question of its long-run
survival.
Proposition 5 Under monotone convergence ( > 1); the small country
survives in the long run if, and only if,  < 2:










This condition reduces to  < 2 since 0 > 1
2 according to proposition 4.
A sucient condition for migration to 
ow monotonically from the small
country to the big one thus requires that individuals have strong prefer-
ences for public goods ( > 1). This 
ow is sustained until a steady state is
reached since migration to the country supplying the largest amount of pub-
lic good increases monotonically this supply through the increase in taxes.
The larger the population in the receiving country, the higher the tax rates
and, accordingly, the larger the tax income available to nance public goods'
supply.
4.2 Migration dynamics when  < 1
When individuals value more weakly the public good (0 <  < 1), it is
conceivable that migration starts with individuals moving from the foreign
country to the home one, in which taxation is milder and net wages more
attractive. However, as the population of the home country increases as a
result of immigration, its tax rate should rise and its wage decrease, making
the home country less attractive than in the previous stage. Then two
alternatives are possible. Either it can still attract agents from the foreign
country which are less mobile than those who were moving in the rst period,
or its attractiveness has decreased to such an extent that all candidates to
migration from country f in the rst period are already in country h. Or it
can even decrease to such an extent that some past migrants now wish to
go back to the foreign country ! In the latter case, migration will reverse
and now takes place from country h to f. In turn, this 
ow can however be
reversed again, after that country f has reached a population size inducing
a suciently low net wage level to justify again a reversal of migration,
now from f to h again. We examine now, as a function of the intensity
parameter ; < 1; when the migration process stops after one period or,
on the contrary, adopts an oscillating behaviour of backward and forward
migration.
When  < 1 and 0 > 1
2; migration takes place at the competitive
equilibrium from the foreign country to the home one. Since (0) = x0 =
(1   )(20   1) > 0; the population in the foreign country decreases to 1
9with
1 = (1   x0)0:
According to the sign of (1) = (1   )(21   1)
= (20   20 + 1)(20   1)(1   ), migration takes place in period 1
from the home to the foreign country when (1) < 0; or again from the
foreign to the home one when (1) > 0: We notice that, when  < 1;
the above quadratic expression in 0 has two roots, namely, 1
2 and 1
2(1 ):







is positive. Consequently, when  > 1
2; we have also 1
2(1 ) > 1; and the
expression is positive for all acceptable values for : We conclude that mi-
gration takes place again from the foreign to the home one. Furthermore,
since a direct comparison shows that x0 > x1; all types who should migrate
from abroad to home in period 1, have already migrated at the end of pe-
riod 0, so that no migration takes place again in period 1, and never in the
future. In other words,








; migration takes place
only in period 1 and stops for ever afterwards.
The case considered in the above proposition is depicted in gure 2 of
the appendix.





; which implies that 1
2(1 ) < 1:
When 0 2 (1
2; 1
2(1 )); then (1) > 0 and migration takes place again from
abroad to home, as in the previous case. Applying the above proposition, we
conclude that migration stops for ever after period 1. It remains to examine
the case (1) < 0.





and 0 2 ( 1
2(1 );1); the populations' dy-
namics oscillate for ever, but the measure of the set of migrants in each









Proof. Suppose that  < 1
2 and that (1) = (20   20 + 1)(20   1)(   1) <





: This implies that, at pe-
riod 1, migration takes place from home to abroad. Then x1 = j(1)j =
(1 )(1 21): Notice that migration, which was from abroad to home at
10the end of period 0, now takes place from home to abroad. Also we observe
again that x0 > x1 so that only the more mobile types of agents are coming
back in their home country. Now let us move to period 2. We have




since 1 + x1   1
2 = 1 + (1   )(1   21)   1
2 = (1
2   )(1   21) > 0:
According to proposition 3, migration in period 2 takes place from foreign to
home since the large country is now the foreign one. We get x2 = j(2)j =
(1   )(22   1): We observe again that x1 > x2
4: More generally,
x2k = j(2k)j = (1   )(22k   1) (9)
x2k+1 = j(2k+1)j = (1   )(1   22k+1);
Furthermore, we have








Accordingly, the home and foreign countries are alternatively the large and
the small country according as t is even or odd. Substituting (9) in equation
(10); we obtain
2k = (1   ) + (2   1)2k 1
2k+1 = (1   ) + (2   1)2k
or,
t = (1   ) + (2   1)t 1:
This rst order linear dierence equation has, as general solution, the fol-
lowing expression
t = (1   )
(2   1)t   1
2(   1)
+ (2   1)t0:









The case considered in the above proposition is depicted in gure 3 in
the appendix.
4x1 > x2 () 1   21 > 22   1
, 1   1   2 = 1   21 + (1   )(21   1) =
= (1   21) > 0:
115 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to develop a simple model of migrations, in which
migration is fundamentally driven by size asymmetries between countries
and by the relative preferences of consumers between private consumption
and consumption of public goods. Public goods' provision is generally -
nanced through public funds. Public spending depends itself on the product
of taxes. When a country is large, the basis for tax collection is wider than
when the country has only few citizens. Thus larger countries are able
to provide a larger amount of public goods and, as far as individuals are
attracted by public goods' abundance, the attraction of living in large coun-
tries should exceed the attraction of living in smaller ones. Accordingly, one
expects migrations to move from small countries to the big ones. Since local
labour markets are closed and the supply of local public goods depends on
local tax income, size asymmetry creates inter-country dierentials in (net)
wages and in the provision of public goods. In the above model, agents are
heterogenous concerning their disutility to move abroad, while their prefer-
ences for public goods are uniform. Also there is no inter-country competi-
tion due to the myopia of the governments, which do not take into account
the eects of their tax decisions on labour mobility. Countries tax their
residents and provide them with public goods without trying to alter the
conditions faced by the other country. In a one-shot approach, migration

ows from the large to the small country if the preferences for public goods
are weak, and 
ows from the small to the big one if public goods' valuation is
high. In a dynamic setting, populations' dynamics are driven by the relative
preferences of consumers between private consumption and consumption of
public goods. The migration observed at equilibrium at any period, as a
consequence of the populations' shares in the preceding period, creates re-
newed populations' shares for the next one: Monotone migrations require
suciently strong preferences for public goods, and can only be sustained
from the small to the large country. Nevertheless, if these preferences are
too strong, the small country incurs the risk of disappearance.We identify
the threshold value of the public goods' intensity of preferences guarantee-
ing the survival of the small country. When the intensity of preferences for
the public good is weaker than this threshold value ( < 1), two alternative
dynamic paths can be followed. Either the attractive country in period 0
can still attract in period 1 agents from the other country which are less
mobile than those who were moving in the rst period, or its attractiveness
has decreased to such an extent that all candidates to migration in period
1 have already moved in the other country in period 0. Then no further
12migration is observed in the future. Or the attractiveness of the receiving
country in period 0 has even decreased in period 1 to such an extent that
some past migrants now wish to go back to their initially home country !
In the latter case, migration now takes place in the reverse direction. In
turn, this 
ow can however be reversed again, after the receiving country in
period 1 has reached a population size inducing a suciently low net wage
level to justify again a new reversal of migration. We show that this dynamic
process nally leads the countries to become of equal size in the long-run.
An interesting extension of our analysis would consist in assuming a
more sophisticated behaviour of the governments when deciding about taxes.
In the present set-up we assume that governments select taxes so as to
maximize the utility of their residents, without accounting for the incidence
of these taxes on the migration pattern these taxes generate (see footnote 3,
page 6). It would be more appealing to assume that governments anticipate
this incidence, and take it into account in their tax decisions. Proceeding
in this way introduces an element of interaction between the decisions of
the two countries' governments : both the direction of migration and its
amplitude depend on the strategies of both of them since the tax selected
by each government nally determines these magnitudes. The situation
could then be formalized as a tax game in which countries adopt a strategic
behaviour and try to be more (or less) attractive in taxes and in the ensuing
provision of public goods provided to its residents.
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